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Abstract: This article considers recent judicial expansion of criminal li-
ability for sexual fraud. This has occurred through the criminalisation of 
words or conduct considered to amount to ‘active deception.’ In con-
trast, non-disclosure of information does not attract criminal liability. 
The article argues that (i) the distinction between active deception and 
non-disclosure of information provides an inadequate basis for setting 
the parameters of criminal liability for sexual fraud, and (ii) the distinc-
tion is vulnerable to analytical collapse and therefore criminal law over-
reach. In relation to (i), five justifications for reliance on the distinction 
will be considered and rejected. These are that criminalisation of active 
deception is less offensive to principles of liberty and causality than 
criminalisation of non-disclosure and that active deception is more 
morally culpable, involves a greater violation of sexual autonomy 
and/or is more harmful than non-disclosure. In developing this argu-
ment the article will draw on examples of sexual intimacy where one of 
the parties is HIV+. In relation to (ii), the article will focus on applica-
tion of the distinction to ‘gender fraud’ claims. The example is a useful 
one because it serves to dramatise the problem of judicial slippage be-
tween active deception and non-disclosure.  
 
 
Key words: sexual fraud, rape, active deception, non-disclosure, transgender, cis-
gender, HIV, liberty, causality, moral culpability, sexual autonomy, harm 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This article considers recent legal developments in relation to criminal liability for 
sexual fraud under English law. While criminalisation of rape-by-fraud, as opposed to 
rape-by-force, has always proved contentious,
1
 the courts have, through a series of 
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recent cases, extended liability in relation to the former and indeed sexual fraud more 
generally. They have done so through invoking an act/omission distinction, whereby 
some deceptions that can be characterised as ‘active,’ as opposed to ‘passive,’ occa-
sion criminal liability.
2
 Not all ‘active’ deceptions produce this effect because the 
courts have made clear that some deceptions will, as a matter of ‘commonsense,’ not 
have the effect of vitiating consent.
3
 However, in relation to deceptions the judiciary 
consider sufficiently material to vitiate consent, establishing criminal liability in the 
future will turn on whether they are characterised as ‘active’ or ‘passive.’ Passive de-
ception would appear to refer to the non-disclosure of information. The article will 
not consider judicial reluctance to criminalise all forms of active deception. While the 
judicial ‘commonsense’ which animates this approach is questionable,4 the article will 
focus on forms of active deception that concern the courts and which are likely to be 
viewed as more serious transgressions in normative terms.  
 
 For some scholars, irrespective of whether the defendant’s conduct is charac-
terised as non-disclosure or active deception, convictions for sexual fraud are a step 
too far.
5
 They represent unwarranted state intrusion into the field of sexual relations. 
Moreover, concern has been expressed as to whether “the courts can be trusted to 
draw a clear line between consent that may be regretted in hindsight, and consent that 
can be said to have been legally negated.”6 For others, the distinction represents a 
failure of the courts to acknowledge fully the value of sexual autonomy.
7
 Most nota-
bly, Jonathan Herring has asserted very clearly, and consistently, that non-disclosure 
of information, considered material to the complainant, ought to vitiate consent and 
that liability is appropriate in circumstances where the defendant appreciates the im-
                                                 
2
 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin); R (on the application of F) v 
DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin); R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051.  
3
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[25]). This judicial view implies that some types of deception are too trivial to vitiate consent. 
4
 Laird, n 1 above 505.  
5
 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
734; A.P. Simester et al., Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 4th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 
755; Gross, n 1 above; Bohlander, n 1 above. It may also be that expansion of criminal liability in this 
area is out of step with community sentiment. In one US study (D.P. Bryden, ‘Redefining Rape’ (2000) 
3 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 317, 470-475, 480-487), 519 male and female respondents across a 
range of age cohorts were asked to indicate whether criminal penalties were appropriate in relation to 
eighteen specific examples of deception prior to sex. A majority of respondents answered affirmatively 
in relation to only five, one of which also involved coercion. The other four examples concerned inti-
mate medical examination, impersonation of the victim’s husband, lying about having a venereal dis-
ease, and failing to disclose a venereal disease (471-472). Interestingly, in the English context, the first 
two are covered by s. 76 of the Sexual Offences Act (SOA) 2003, while the third falls with the ‘active 
deception’ category developed by the courts. Only the final example falls outside English law. In rela-
tion to deception concerning ‘infidelity, wealth, marital status, use of a birth control device (by a wom-
an), intention to marry, [and] intention to pay a prostitute’ the respondents “rejected criminal liability 
by a wide margin” (472).  
6
 C. McCartney and N. Wortley, ‘Raped by the State’ (2014) 78(1) Journal of Criminal Law 1, 3.  
7
 Herring [2005], n 1 above. See also S. Schulofer, ‘Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously’ (1992) 11 
Law and Philosophy 35, 90; D. Archard, Sexual Consent (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998); 
A. Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); T. 
Dougherty, ‘Sex, Lies and Consent’ (2013) 123(4) Ethics 717.  
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portance of the information to the complainant.
8
 For other scholars again, the problem 
is not so much one of too much or too little law, but the wrong kind of law. In particu-
lar, they argue that rape-by-fraud cases are inappropriately labelled, and in ways that 
fail to capture and communicate the wrong involved.
9
 In this article, I do not propose 
to enter into the debate between Jonathan Herring and his many detractors,
10
 or at 
least, not directly. I have elsewhere, expressed serious misgivings about the expansion 
of criminal liability in this area.
11
 Rather, it is use of the act/omission distinction as 
the means to establish criminal liability for sexual fraud that this article will chal-
lenge.  
 
 In my view, there are two principal difficulties with judicial reliance on the 
distinction. First, it is questionable whether the distinction provides an adequate basis 
for setting the parameters of criminal liability. Second, while the distinction appears 
to carve out a legal space for the protection of privacy and liberty, at least to the ex-
tent that no representations are made through speech or conduct, this assumes that dis-
tinctions between non-disclosure and active deception are always easy to make. If this 
assumption is false, at least in some cases, then the distinction is susceptible to “judi-
cial manipulation,”12 and a danger arises that non-disclosure of information might, of 
itself, lead to convictions.  
 
To clarify then, the questions to be considered in this article are: 
 
1. Does the distinction between active deception and non-disclosure of information 
provide an adequate basis for setting the parameters of criminal liability?  
 
2. Is the distinction sufficiently clear-cut to avoid analytical collapse and therefore 
criminal law overreach? 
 
 
JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL FRAUD  
 
Before turning to these two questions, the article will first summarise the recent legal 
trend  by virtue of which liability for sexual fraud has been expanded. In 2003, the 
                                                 
8
 Herring [2005], note 1 above 517. Herring has acknowledged that few legal scholars are prepared to 
endorse his position (J. Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 484. Indeed, Andrew Simester and David Ormerod, respectively, have de-
scribed it as “preposterous” and as “frightening in its ramifications” (A.P. Simester et al, n 5 above 
755; Ormerod, n 5 above 734). 
9
 A. Pundik, ‘Coercion and Deception in Sexual Relations’ (2015) 28 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 97; J. Chalmers and F. Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71 Modern 
Law Review 217; B. Mitchell, ‘Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency 
and Fair Labelling’ (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 393. Fair labelling, in this context, would require a 
new offence, either a lesser sexual offence, like a degendered version of the repealed offence of ‘pro-
curing a woman by false pretenses’ (SOA 1956 s. 3) or a non-sexual fraud offence.  
10
 Gross, n 1 above; Bohlander, n 1 above; Ormerod, n 5 above; Simester et al, n 5 above.  
11
 Sharpe, n 1 above.  
12
 T. Elliot and D. Ormerod, ‘Act and Omissions - A Distinction Without a Defence’ (2008) 39 Cam-
brian Law Review 40, 42.  
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Sexual Offences Act (SOA), informed by the Setting the Boundaries Report,
13
 ex-
panded the actus reus element of non-consent.
14
 However, in relation to sexual of-
fences committed by fraud, and despite the Report’s recommendation to criminalise 
“sexual penetration of anyone in any part of the world by deception,”15 the Act devel-
oped this area of the law to only a limited extent. By virtue of s. 76, consent is to be 
conclusively presumed to be absent where the defendant intentionally (a) deceived the 
complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act or (b) induced the com-
plainant to consent to the relevant act by impersonating a person known personally to 
the complainant. In general, the courts have proved reluctant to rely on these provi-
sions, and in particular s. 76(2)(a), as a means of extending liability,
16
 in large part 
due to their conclusive nature with regard to the consent question. In contrast to this 
restrictive interpretation of s. 76, and despite the view of some legal commentators 
that s. 76 exhausts the ways in which sexual fraud might be perpetrated,
17
 the courts 
have interpreted the general consent provision in s. 74
18
 in an increasingly liberal 
manner to cover fraud cases.  
 
 The emergence of the active deception/non-disclosure distinction, whereby 
liability for sexual fraud has been both expanded and delimited is, perhaps, first evi-
dent in the case of R v EB.
19
 In this case, Latham LJ made clear that “there was no 
question of any deception”20 in circumstances where the defendant had not disclosed 
his HIV+ status to the complainant. This raised a question as to the significance of 
more active forms of deception, such as lying.
21
 This question was addressed in 
Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority, where the Divisional Court first empha-
sised that R v EB “goes no further than deciding that a failure to disclose HIV infec-
tion is not of itself a relevant consideration under s. 74.”22 The court went on to make 
clear that active deception fell within the provision. The active deception in this case 
was found to consist in having sexual intercourse without a condom or continuing to 
do so after removing, damaging or tearing the condom, after it had been made clear 
by the complainant that consent was conditional on condom use.
23
 In the subsequent 
                                                 
13
 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences (London: HMSO, 
2000), Vol 1.  
14
 SOA 2003 ss. 74-76.  
15
 Home Office (2000), n 13 above recommendation 14, p. xiii.  
16
 See R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 at [28]; Assange n 2 above at [87]; R (on the application of 
F) v DPP n 2 above at [26]; R v B [2013] EWCA Crim 823 at [24]; McNally n 2 above at [18]. The 
case of R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527 provides an exception.  
17
 J. Miles, ‘Sexual Offences: Consent, Capacity and Children’ [2008] Archbold News 6; J. Rogers, 
‘The Effect of ‘Deception’ in the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ (2013) Archbold Review 7; J. Rogers, 
‘Further Developments under the Sexual Offences Act’ (2013) 7 Archbold Review 7. 
18
 SOA, s 74: ‘A person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that 
choice.’ 
19
 R v EB [2006] EWCA Crim 2945.  
20
 ibid at [21]. 
21
 R. Card, Criminal Law, 20th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 340. 
22
 Assange n 2 above at [90]. 
23
 Andrew Simester et al have expressed scepticism concerning the view that Assange’s conduct vitiat-
ed consent under s 74. They argue that if this proposition is correct then it must also follow logically, 
though perhaps counter-intuitively (see Bryden, n 5 above), that “a man’s consent would be vitiated if 
he made it clear that he would not have sexual intercourse with a woman unless she was practising 
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cases of R (on the application of F) v DPP and R v McNally, the courts also found 
against defendants on the basis of explicit findings of active deception.
24
 In these cas-
es, active deception was found to consist in ejaculating into the defendant’s wife’s 
vagina despite prior agreement that consent was subject to not doing so,
25
 and in de-
liberately deceiving the complainant “into believing that the [the defendant was] 
male.’26 Thus it would appear that criminal liability for fraud in this area now turns on 
the act/omission distinction. It is toward a critique of the use of this distinction for the 
purposes of establishing criminal liability that attention now turns.  
 
1. DOES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIVE DECEPTION AND NON-
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR 
SETTING THE PARAMETERS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
In thinking about the merits of the judicial distinction between active deception and 
non-disclosure there are a number of potential justifications for the criminalisation of 
the former, but not the latter. First, it might be argued that criminalising active decep-
tion does not offend against the principle of liberty, or at least not to the same degree 
as criminalising omission. Second, it might be argued that, unlike active deception, 
non-disclosure of information lacks a causal relationship to harm. Third, it might be 
argued that active deception involves greater moral culpability than non-disclosure. 
Fourth, it might be argued that active deception entails a greater violation of sexual 
autonomy. Finally, it might be argued that active deception is more harmful to the 
victim. I will argue, to the contrary, that lying or actively misleading do not necessari-
ly entail all, or indeed any, of these things or at least not in the ways that might be im-
agined. To illustrate the difficulty, I will work with four hypothetical scenarios where 
one of the sexual parties is HIV+ and where the other would not have consented to 
sexual intercourse if aware of this fact. Until recently, ‘apparent’ consent to sex with a 
person infected with the HIV virus operated as valid consent for the purposes of adult 
sexual offences, irrespective of the judicial distinction.
27
 In view of recent cases how-
ever, prosecution is now perhaps likely to be viewed as appropriate by the CPS in cir-
cumstances of active deception concerning HIV+ status. The selection of HIV, as the 
example to work with, is informed by this fact and also by the fact that it is generally 
considered to be a particularly serious transgression in normative terms.
28
 This can be 
contrasted with examples of ‘fraud’ that have generally been given short shrift by the 
courts in terms of their analysis of consent and harm.
29
  
 
HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS (A-D) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
contraception, and the woman, wishing to get pregnant, told him that she was when she was not” (n 5 
above 475).  
24
 R (on the application of F) v DPP n 2 above; McNally n 2 above.  
25
 R (on the application of F) v DPP n 2 above.  
26
 McNally n 2 above at [26].  
27 However, non-disclosure of HIV+ status will ground a successful prosecution for non-fatal assault in 
circumstances where the virus is transmitted: R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103; R v Konzani [2005] 
EWCA Crim 706). For a critique of criminalisation of HIV transmission generally see M. Weait, Inti-
macy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (London: Routledge, 2007). 
28
 Bryden, n 5 above.  
29
 See n 3 above.  
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(A). D, aware V would not have consented to sex had D disclosed his HIV+ status, 
had sex with V. 
 
(B). D, aware V would not have consented to sex had D disclosed his HIV+ status, 
lied when asked and then had sex with V.  
 
(C). D, aware V would not have consented to sex had D disclosed his HIV+ status, 
had sex with V. Sexual intercourse was unprotected and D was not on ART (anti-
retroviral treatment).  
 
(D). D, aware V would not have consented to sex had D disclosed his HIV+ status, 
lied when asked and then had sex with V. D was on ART, had a very low viral load, 
and used a condom.  
 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DISTINCTION  
 
(i) the liberty principle 
 
According to the liberty principle, punishing omissions, in the absence of a specific 
duty to act, is considered a much more serious encroachment on personal liberty than 
the punishment of acts.
30
 The essence of the concern is explained by Herring: “[w]hen 
the law renders a particular act illegal, that is often not a huge infringement of liberty. 
The fact that you cannot hit somebody still leaves you with plenty of other options 
with what to do with your time! However, by punishing omissions, the law leaves the 
citizen with only one thing they can do to comply with the law.”31 There are however, 
various objections to the use of the liberty principle to limit criminalisation of omis-
sions. Thus, for example, in the classic case of the drowning child,
32
 an obligation to 
rescue is arguably a miminal encroachment on personal autonomy. This is because 
encountering a child facing this particular peril is (a) unlikely for any particular indi-
vidual, (b) requires little in terms of time and personal resources to meet the obliga-
tion and therefore is unlikely to interfere with pursuit of life goals, and (c) is unlikely 
to have a significant impact on the rescuer, especially when compared with the impact 
omission may have on the child. Another major objection to the liberty principle, as a 
reason for not criminalising omissions, is that it sacrifices the fostering of obligations 
of social responsibility.
33
  
 
 Of course, it may be that different factors will assume different degrees of sig-
nificance depending on the specific issue that the courts seek to resolve through the 
act/omission distinction. Thus, for example, analysis of the rescue principle might dif-
fer from analysis of the criminal law homicide distinction between killing and letting 
die. In the present context of sexual intimacy there are clearly differences. Moreover, 
the differences tend against the liberty argument for not criminalising omissions. 
                                                 
30
 G. Williams, ‘Criminal Omissions - The Conventional View’ (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 87. 
31
 J. Herring, Great Debates in Criminal Law (3rd edn) (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015) 32. 
32
 K. Ridolfi, ’Law, Ethics, and the Good Samaritan: Should there be a Duty to Rescue?’ (2000) Santa 
Clara Law Rev 957; S. Heyman, ‘Foundations of the Duty to Rescue’ (1994) 47 Vanderbilt Law Re-
view 673.   
33
 A. Ashworth, ‘The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions’ (1989) 105 Law Quarterly Review 
424. 
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Thus, while an obligation to act may, in some cases, divert an individual from other 
activity, including socially beneficial activity, this is not the case regarding sexual in-
timacy. This is because, in this context, the purpose in which the actor is engaged is 
the sexual intimacy itself. Thus, unlike in the case of the drowning child, the liberty 
principle appears to be of little relevance. The actor cannot pursue other options pre-
cisely because he has commenced or is pursuing a sexually intimate encounter with 
the party to whom a moral, if not legal, obligation to act might be said to exist.  
 
(ii) the causal nexus  
 
The criminalisation of omissions is also said to fall foul of the logic of causality.
34
 
Thus, it is argued, that in contrast to acts, “omissions do not cause anything.”35 As 
Moore puts it: “when I omit to prevent some harm I do not make the world worse … 
only when I cause that harm to occur - through my actions - do I worsen the world.”36 
At worst, doing nothing leaves the victim in the same condition as she was to begin 
with. This causality argument has produced a series of counter-arguments.
37
 These 
include arguments centred around scientific cause and effect and recognition that le-
gal causation is more important than ‘but-for’ causation in attributing liability. In rela-
tion to the former argument emphasis is sometimes placed on the distinction between 
events and facts. While omissions are not events, they are clearly facts. In this way, a 
causal nexus can be established through focusing on the relationship between facts (as 
opposed to events) and outcomes.
38
 In the present context of sexual intimacy, the case 
for claiming the existence of a causal relationship between omission and outcome is 
stronger than, for example, in the case of the drowning child. In the latter case, it 
might be said that ‘but-for’ the defendant not happening upon the drowning child, the 
child would have died in the same way. Of course, and in a reversal of the argument, 
it could be contended that ‘but-for’ “the defendant’s failure to rescue the child that 
child would have lived.”39 The difficulty with this argument, as Herring notes, is that 
it is “subject to the riposte that but for everyone’s failure to rescue the child he or she 
would have lived.”40 In any event, in relation to sexual intimacy, the case for arguing 
that a causal relationship exists between omission and outcome appears much strong-
er. While not the only cause, it seems clear that omission is a causal factor in circum-
                                                 
34
 The argument that liability should arise where the defendant created the risk of harm is really a spe-
cies of the causation argument (G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
1978) 601.  
35
 M.S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law (1993) 
28-29. See also M. Moore, Causation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2009); H. Beebee, 
‘Causing and Nothingness’ in J. Collins & N. Hall (ed) Causation and Counterfactuals (MIT Press, 
2004).   
36
 Moore (1993), n 35 above 29 (as quoted by Roni Rosenberg, ‘Between Killing and Letting Die in 
Criminal Jursiprudence’ (2014) 34 Northern Illinois University Law Review 391, 401).  
37
 Moore himself offers some caveats (n 35 above 54-57).  
38
 D.H. Mellor, The Facts of Causation (London: Routledge, 1995).  
39
 Herring, n 31 above 30.  
40
 Herring, n 31 above 30. One response to this dilemma can be found in Hart and Honore’s approach 
to causation. This approach distinguishes between normal and abnormal events (H.L.A. Hart and A. 
Honore, Causation in the Law (2nd edn) (Oxford University Press, 1985). According to this distinction, 
causation might be established in relation to an omission to respond to an abnormal event (such as a 
child drowning). However, the distinction begs the question regarding what is normal/abnormal and is 
likely to render law unpredictable if utilised for the purposes of developing doctrine. 
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stances were, for example, a complainant would not have had sex with the defendant 
had she known that he was HIV+. Moreover, unlike the drowning child example, 
where liability for omission might extend to everyone present, in the case of sexual 
intimacy liability is limited to a single individual.  
 
(iii) moral culpability of the defendant  
 
It has been noted that the act/omission distinction is “deeply rooted in the common 
law”41 and that over time the courts have tended to restrict the criminalisation of 
omission.
42
 In doing so, they have been quite explicit in “espousing moral differences 
between acts and omissions.”43 Indeed, they have perhaps persisted with the distinc-
tion “precisely because of [their] belief that the distinction reflects an important moral 
distinction.”44 However, while the courts place emphasis on the moral importance of 
the distinction, this appears to be more a matter of judicial ‘common sense,’ than the 
product of rigorous analysis. The failure of the courts to articulate a clear rationale 
does not, of course, mean one is lacking. Accordingly, in thinking about the moral 
culpability of defendants, we should recognise the claim that there are morally signif-
icant differences between acting and omitting to act. Stephen Wilkinson has argued 
that there are moral distinctions between lying, actively misleading and non-
disclosure.
45
 He contends that “lying is worse than other ways of not telling the truth’ 
because ‘lying does more damage to relationships of trust”.46 This may or may not be 
true. It is an empirical question as Wilkinson recognises. An emphasis on trust how-
ever, proves problematic for a number of other reasons. In the first place, Wilkinson 
develops his claim in the medical context of the doctor-patient relationship where the 
element of trust is especially recognised. A focus on trust in the criminal law context 
may be less appropriate because of the different and non-professional nature of the 
relationship and because of the implications for liberty that necessarily attend the 
criminal law. In R v McNally, the Court of Appeal refused to characterise the defend-
ant’s ‘active deception’ as a breach of trust, precisely because the relationship be-
tween defendant and complainant lacked this professional quality.
47
  
 
 Alan Wertheimer suggests that, while the question of criminal liability for 
sexual fraud must be resolved “by moral argument as to what the parties who engage 
in sexual relations owe to each other by way of intentional falsehood and disclosure 
of information”48 it would “probably be a mistake to apply a strong fiduciary model to 
sexual relations among competent adults.”49 However, application of such a model to 
                                                 
41
 J.G. Fleming, Law of Torts (8th edn) (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1992) 146. See also P. 
Glazebrook, ‘Criminal Omissions’ (1960) 76 Law Quarterly Review 386.  
42
 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason & History (London: Butterworths, 2001) 120. 
43
 Elliot and Ormerod, n 12 above 53. See, for example, R v Lowe [1973] 1 QB 702.  
44
 Elliot and Ormerod, n 12 above 53. 
45
 S. Wilkinson, ‘Why Lying Is Worse Than Merely Misleading’ (2000) 13 Philosophy Today 6-7.  
46
 ibid 7.  
47
 In this regard, the court distanced itself from the view of the trial judge, and this factor proved sig-
nificant in sentence reduction. The court also noted that s. 21 of the SOA, while not directly applicable, 
“defines ‘position of trust’ for the purposes of ss. 16-19 of the Act as covering relationships such as 
teacher and pupil or doctor and patient” (McNally n 2 above at [49-51]).  
48
 A. Wertheimer, ‘Consent and Sexual Relations’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 89-112, 105. 
49
 ibid 109. 
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sexual relations has its supporters. Thus, Herring contends that “sexual partners owe 
to each other heightened standards of obligation of a fiduciary nature.”50 Of course, 
Herring would insist on a heightened standard irrespective of whether a defendant 
acts deceptively or fails to disclose material information. Importantly, even if we were 
to concede that a fiduciary model of sexual relations is an appropriate one for estab-
lishing criminal liability, any assumption that the active deception/non-disclosure dis-
tinction expresses, or indeed is even consistent with, the underlying rationale of that 
model is dubious. That is to say, it is difficult to conclude that lying, more than non-
disclosure, necessarily constitutes a more serious breach of trust. This claim can be 
demonstrated through considering the hypothetical scenarios involving HIV.  
 
 Thus application of the distinction would lead to convictions in scenarios B 
and D, but not A and C. I would argue that such outcomes, ones that follow the line of 
reasoning exhibited in the cases discussed, contradict any claim that the distinction 
satisfactorily distributes defendants in terms of moral culpability. In all four scenarios, 
the defendant was unwilling to disclose his HIV+ status and was aware that sex was 
conditional on his not being HIV+. In this regard, the scenarios are not distinguished 
by an intent/recklessness divide. That is, none of the scenarios involve only risk-
taking. Two differences between scenarios B and D, and scenarios A and C, are that 
in scenarios B and D the victim is proactive in asking about the defendant's HIV sta-
tus and the defendant lies. However, in relation to the culpability question, only lying 
is relevant. Of course, lying is a more active form of deception than non-disclosure. 
But this does not, of itself, demonstrate greater culpability. Indeed, I would suggest 
that while the defendant in scenario B may be more morally culpable than the defend-
ant in scenario A, it is certainly not the case that active deception in scenario D is 
more morally culpable than non-disclosure in scenario C. This is because, in scenario 
D, lying needs to be considered in relation to other features of the scenario.  
 
 The specific features that ought to be valued here are that the defendant is (i) 
on anti-retroviral drugs and has a low viral load and (ii) used a condom. While the 
defendant’s actions might be viewed as unethical, they do demonstrate a quite differ-
ent relation to risk and harm, one that might be viewed as lessening culpability. Cer-
tainly, in scenario C, the defendant exposes the victim to a significant risk of serious 
harm, whereas in scenario D, though the defendant lies, the risk of harm to which the 
victim is exposed is minimal.
51
 Moreover, while the defendant in scenario C is highly 
likely to be aware of a serious risk of harm to the victim, the defendant in scenario D 
is likely to be aware of the exceptionally low risk of transmission of the virus. It is 
true in scenario D, that while lying might not be motivated by a desire to have sex, the 
defendant is aware of the absence of consent. However, this is true in all four scenari-
os. What is problematic, is the fact that the defendant who took responsibility for his 
own sexual health, practised safe sex, and who accordingly exhibited some degree of 
care and concern toward the ‘victim,’ is more likely to be convicted of a sexual of-
                                                 
50
 Herring [2005], n 1 above 515. 
51
 ART (antiretroviral treatment) reduces the HIV viral load in blood, semen and vaginal and rectal 
fluids to very low levels reducing the risk of HIV transmission. Studies have shown the risk to be re-
duced by 96% (M.S. Cohen et al, ‘Prevention of HIV-1 Infection with Early Antiretroviral Therapy’ 
(2011) 365(5) The New England Journal of Medicine 493). Follow up studies have confirmed very low 
infection rates (J.M. Baeten, ‘Antiretroviral Prophylaxis for HIV Prevention in Heterosexual Men and 
Women’ (2012) 367(5) The New England Journal of Medicine 399). 
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fence under the judicial distinction under consideration. This appears to me to be intu-
itively wrong.  Reasoning by analogy in this way suggests that the assumption that 
active deception necessarily involves a greater breach of trust than non-disclosure is 
misplaced, at least in some plausible cases. As Ashworth has reminded us, “the act-
omission distinction should not be used as a cloak for avoiding the moral issues.”52  
 
(iv) violation of the victim’s sexual autonomy 
 
Sexual autonomy is an important right. It is debateable however, whether it ought to 
be viewed as having been infringed by deception in circumstances falling outside s. 
76 of the SOA. According to Jennifer Temkin, while deceptions falling within s. 76 
deprive a woman of “her right to choose whether and with whom to have sexual inter-
course … the same is not true of the man who falsely assures a woman that he will 
love, marry, promote or house her if she has intercourse with him.”53 Conversely, 
Herring insists on a contextual and subjective approach which recognises that, for 
some people, a declaration of love makes “all the difference in the world.”54 For pre-
sent purposes however, we are not concerned with the subject-matter of fraud, but ra-
ther with the manner in which it is perpetrated, and crucially whether it can be said 
that the manner of perpetration matters in terms of the degree to which the right to 
sexual autonomy is violated. In essence, the question becomes, if we assume violation 
of sexual autonomy in cases of deception, can it be said that the violation is any great-
er in the case of active deception than it is in cases of non-disclosure? While there are 
scholars who would support/oppose prosecution in either case, the point here is to ex-
press skepticism concerning any claim that the right to sexual autonomy can justify 
the judicial distinction. Turning to our hypothetical HIV scenarios, it is clear, assum-
ing the victim has a right to know about the defendant’s HIV+ status,55 that consent is 
lacking in all four scenarios. This is so because the victim would not have had sex 
with the defendant in any of the scenarios had she known the truth. However, in order 
to make the case that active deception is more problematic than non-disclosure it 
would be necessary to conclude that the source of our ignorance or error matters. Yet, 
as Claudia Mills points out: “All that really seems to matter, for evaluating the auton-
omy of my choice, is what I know or do not know, not how I came by my state of 
knowledge or ignorance.”56  
 
(v) harmful consequences 
 
If lying cannot be described as more culpable than non-disclosure, or at least not suf-
ficiently so to justify a different criminal law response, and if sexual autonomy is 
about informed consent rather than how information is acquired, it might still be ar-
gued that active deception produces greater harm than non-disclosure and that this 
                                                 
52
 A. Ashworth, Principles of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 100. See also 
Elliot and Ormerod n 12 above; V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) Chp 7.  
53
 J. Temkin, ‘Towards a Modern Law of Rape’ (1982) 45 Modern Law Review 399, 405.  
54
 Herring [2005], n 1 above 521.  
55
 It is not clear that HIV+ people should necessarily bear a moral obligation to disclose, and this is 
especially so where the risk of transmission is exceptionally low. 
56
 C. Mills, ‘Passing: The Ethics of Pretending to be What You Are Not’ (1999) 25(1) Social Theory & 
Practice 29-51, 5.   
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justifies differential treatment. However, a number of difficulties arise here. Putting to 
one side, debate over whether sexual fraud produces harm sufficient to justify resort 
to the criminal law,
57
 we are still left with the problem of explaining how active de-
ception involves a surfeit of harm. In my view, while sexual fraud might lead to harm 
(psychological or emotional)
58
 and does entail harm in the sense of a set-back to a 
rights-based interest
59
 or public good
60
 (sexual autonomy), it is hardly convincing to 
suggest that harm is magnified in the case of lying, as opposed to non-disclosure of 
facts that bear such psychological/emotional significance.  
 
 Thus, if we consider our hypothetical scenarios involving HIV, it is hardly 
plausible to argue that the active deception in scenarios B and D led the victim to ex-
perience a greater degree of psychological or emotional harm than non-disclosure in 
scenarios A and C. In all four scenarios, assuming that the victim learns of the de-
fendant's HIV+ status subsequent to sexual intimacy, there is either anxiety about the 
possibility of transmission or there is not. Indeed, in terms of possible psychological 
harm, non-disclosure might actually be more harmful than active deception. While 
this might seem counter-intuitive, we should recognise that in the case of non-
disclosure, the victim who proceeds with sex draws a false conclusion regarding the 
HIV status of the other party. Accordingly, she might feel more responsible for the 
sexually intimate encounter than had she been the recipient of a lie.  
 
 Another example that illustrates the difficulty of the active deception/non-
disclosure distinction, at least if harm is the benchmark of its intelligibility, is one that 
compares HIV scenario C
61
 with the case of  R v Devonald.
62
 In this case, a middle-
aged man was convicted under s. 4 of the SOA on the basis that he had caused a 
young man to masturbate in front or a webcam as revenge for what he believed to be 
the boy’s mistreatment of his daughter. Yet, the potential for harm evident in HIV 
scenario C, a scenario which according to the logic of the active deception/non-
disclosure distinction would not lead to a criminal conviction, appears to be out of all 
proportion to the ‘harm’ occasioned in the active deception case of Devonald.  
 
2. IS THE DISTINCTION SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR-CUT TO AVOID ANALYTI-
CAL COLLAPSE AND THEREFORE CRIMINAL LAW OVERREACH? 
 
Thus far, this article has considered whether the distinction between active deception 
and non-disclosure provides an adequate basis for setting the parameters for criminal 
liability. To that end, a series of justifications for the distinction have been considered 
                                                 
57
 While liberal scholars generally insist on the demonstration of harm or the risk of harm as a neces-
sary pre-condition to the criminalisation of conduct, it is clear wrongs can occur in the absence of 
harm, as Gardner’s “pure rape” example illustrates (J. Gardner, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’ in Offences 
and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (OUP, 2007) 5). Gardner refers to 
scenarios where the victim (and everyone else) remains oblivious to the fact that she was raped while 
unconscious.  
58
 In rejecting Gross’ accusation of legal moralism (n 1 above 225-227), Herring insists that deceptions 
may and do produce ‘serious harms’ ([2007] n 1 above 228).  
59
 Archard, n 7 above 97.  
60
 Gardner, n 57 above 1-32, 31. 
61
 EB n 19 above.  
62
 Devonald n 16 above. 
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and their shortcomings highlighted. However, even if a clear rationale and justifica-
tion for the distinction between active deception and non-disclosure proves elusive, it 
might be thought that the distinction offers a clear legal test likely to assist courts in 
navigating their way through the murky waters of sexual fraud. Framing the issue in 
this way however, assumes that the distinction is analytically robust. Yet, scholars 
have highlighted difficulties associated with the so-called “definition question.”63 
Criticism has, perhaps, been especially pronounced in relation to the criminal law 
homicide distinction between killing and letting die.
64
 This is due, at least in part, to 
the willingness of courts, in this context, to characterise as omission what is, on any 
logical reckoning, action. Thus in Airdale NHS Trust v Bland, the House of Lords de-
fined the turning off of a life support machine as an omission on the basis that it was 
equivalent to having never turned the machine on in the first place.
65
  
 
 In this part of the article however, I want to challenge the analytical robustness 
of the distinction through considering how it is applied to gender fraud cases. This 
example serves to highlight the definitional problem. It will be argued that the legal 
reasoning in cases of this kind evinces considerable slippage between active deception 
and non-disclosure. Moreover, this slippage is, it will be argued, the effect of the 
power of cissexism.
66
 Thus, while Elliot and Ormerod have expressed concern that 
the act/omission distinction is vulnerable to “judicial manipulation,”67 the argument 
here is that the problem is not simply one of judicial intent but an unacknowledged, 
and perhaps unconscious, interpretational commitment to cisnormativity. In the first 
part of this article, we considered HIV scenarios as a vehicle for thinking about 
whether the distinction is an adequate basis for setting the parameters of criminal lia-
bility. It is worth stating what might seem obvious, namely that HIV+ status is a fact 
that may or may not be disclosed and in relation to which active deception might oc-
cur. In relation to gender status however, the ‘facts’ in question are considerably more 
complex and contestable and in ways that call the distinction, or at least its practical 
application, into question.  
 
THE CASE OF GENDER FRAUD 
 
                                                 
63
 Rosenberg, n 36 above 393.  
64
 See, for example, J. Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland’ (1997) 
113 Law Quarterly Review 481; J.M. Finnis, ‘Bland: Crossing the Rubicon’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly 
Review 329.  
65
 [1993] AC 789 (HL). 
66
 Cissexism refers to the belief that transgender people’s gender identities “are inferior to, or less au-
thentic than, those of cissexuals” (J. Serrano, Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the 
Scapegoating of Femininity (Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 2007) 12). The term cissexual refers to people 
“who have only ever experienced their subconscious and physical sexes as being aligned” (p 33). It is 
used in preference to terms like natural, real, biological, genetic or other terms which presuppose and 
reinforce the primacy of cissexual people. The term cisgender refers to those cissexual people who are 
comfortable with gender expectations that are socially constructed to follow from the fact of cissexuali-
ty. In this article, I will use both cisgender and cissexual depending on the context. However, I will 
typically use cisgender because cisgender people are also cissexual, while the reverse is not necessarily 
so (queer identified people, in particular, are not cisgender) and it is cisgender, rather than cissexual, 
status that is likely to be the better indicator of whether a gender fraud complaint will be made.  
67
 Elliot and Ormerod, n 12 above 42.  
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In recent decades, a series of successful ‘gender fraud’ prosecutions have been 
brought in the UK, the US and Israel against young female-bodied people who identi-
fy as transgender
68
 men, gender queer
69
 and/or lesbian.
70
 At the time of the alleged 
offences, the convicted defendants were aged between 17-23, while the complainants, 
who were all cisgender women, were aged between 15-26.
71
 The first prosecution oc-
curred in 1991. In R v Saunders (unrep), Jimmy Saunders, then aged 17, was sen-
tenced to prison for six years after being convicted of several counts of indecent as-
sault pertaining to two young cisgender women.
72
 The 1990s also witnessed two 
prosecutions in the United States. In People v Clark, Sean O’Neill was tried in the 
State of Colorado and convicted of the rape of four young women, each of whom he 
had dated.
73
 He received a custodial sentence of three months and a period of proba-
tion.
74
 The following year,
 
Christopher Wheatley, then aged 20, was convicted of 
third degree rape in the State of Washington.
75
 He was sentenced to prison for twen-
ty-seven months.
76
 In 2003, in Israel v Alkobi, Hen Alkobi, then aged 20, was con-
victed of false impersonation of a man and attempting to penetrate the complainant’s 
genitalia with an object and was sentenced to six months in prison, commuted to six 
months of community service and twenty-four months probation.
77
 In 2012, in R v 
Barker (unrep), Gemma Barker, then aged 19, was convicted of two counts of sexual 
                                                 
68
 The term transgender has become something of an umbrella term for all trans identified people (see 
K. Bornstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest of Us (New York: Routledge, 1994); L. 
Feinberg, Transgender Warriors: Making History from Joan of Arc to RuPaul (Boston: Beacon, 1996). 
For the purposes of this article, it is used in a more limited sense to refer to people who feel incongru-
ence between their gender identity and their anatomy. The term transsexual is often used in this re-
spect. However, the term transsexual fails to exhaust this group because many transgender people re-
fuse the transsexual label because of its medical history and pathologising effects (see A. Sharpe, 
Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (London: Cavendish, 2002) Chp 2).  
69
 The term gender queer denotes a person who does not subscribe to conventional gender distinctions 
but identifies with neither, both, or a combination of male and female genders (J. Nestle et al, Gender-
Queer: Voices from Beyond the Sexual Binary (New York: Alyson Books, 2002).  
70
 Precise gender identification is not always clear from legal and media reporting of some of the cases 
and this might be viewed as serving only to complicate the legal issues and their resolution.  
71
 The fact that some complainants were minors (for example in the Barker and Wilson cases) ought 
not to be viewed as relevant because, at least in relation to the UK prosecutions: (a) no defendant was 
charged with a sexual offence against a minor, (b) Wilson had a reasonable belief that the complainant 
was 16 and (c) CPS practice is not to prosecute, in the absence of aggravating factors, where consensu-
al sexual activity takes place between parties who are young and close in age. 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/sentencing_manual/s9_sexual_activity_with_a_child/ (last ac-
cessed: 22/12/15).  
72
 [1991] (unrep) Pink Paper, 196, 12/10/91. For a discussion of the Saunders case see A.M. Smith, 
‘The Regulation of Lesbian Sexuality through Erasure: the case of Jennifer Saunders’ in J. Kay (ed) 
Lesbian Erotics (New York University Press, 1995) 164-179. The offence of Indecent Assault was re-
pealed in 2003 by the SOA and replaced by the section 3 offence of Sexual Assault which is committed 
where the defendant intentionally touches the victim without her consent.  
73
 No. 1994CR003290 (Colo. Dist Ct. Feb. 16, 1996) (on file with Harvard Law School Library). Clark 
was given the name O’Neill at birth. For discussion of the case see J.L. Nye, ‘The Gender Box’ (1998) 
13 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 226; P. Califia, Sex Changes: The Politics of Transgenderism (2nd 
edn, Cleis Press 2003) 234-237.  
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 J. Green, ‘Predator?’ San Francisco Bay Times, 22 Feb 1996. 
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  State v Wheatley No. 97-1-50056-6 (Wash. Superior Ct. 13 May 1997).  
76
 ibid.  
77
 For a discussion and critique of the Hen Alkobi case see Aeyal Gross, ‘Gender Outlaws before the 
law: the courts of the borderland’ (2009) 32(1) Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 165.  
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assault by an English court and received a custodial sentence of thirty months.
78
 In 
2013, two further prosecutions followed in the UK. First, in R v McNally, Justine 
McNally, then aged 17, was convicted of six counts of sexual assault by penetration 
and sentenced to three years imprisonment.
79
 Later that year, in R v Wilson (unrep), 
Christopher Wilson, then aged 22, was convicted by a Scottish court of two counts of 
obtaining sexual intimacy by fraud and sentenced to three years probation and 240 
hours of community service.
80
 In 2015, in R v Newland (unrep), Gayle Newland, then 
aged 25, was convicted of three counts of sexual assault by penetration and sentenced 
to 8 years imprisonment. Most recently, in R v Kyran Lee (Mason) (unrep), Kyran 
Lee, then aged 25, was convicted of one count of sexual assault by penetration and 
received a suspended sentence of two years. All convicted defendants were placed on 
sex offenders registers for life.
81
  
 
 In most of these cases it is unclear whether convictions were sustained on the 
basis of active deception or non-disclosure or whether any consideration was given to 
such a distinction. In reality, and precisely because the distinction tends to unravel in 
transgender and gender queer contexts, it is likely that non-disclosure has proved suf-
ficient for conviction. This is certainly the case in the transgender case of Wilson 
where Lord Bannatyne made clear, in his sentencing judgment, that “deception lay in 
not disclosing … biological sex.”82 In other cases, the basis for conviction is not ren-
dered explicit. In the Alkobi case, conviction for false impersonation of a man reveals 
the dilemma such a distinction produces for transgender people. The word impersona-
tion which, of course, hints at an ontological problem evident in such prosecutions, 
suggests active conduct as opposed to omission. Yet, on this reckoning, and precisely 
because transgender operates as a synonym for deception in a ciscentric society, 
transgender people cannot avoid active status. Every word, every gesture, every man-
                                                 
78
 The Daily Mail Online, 6/3/13 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2110430/Gemma-Barker-
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79
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nerism, no matter how consistent with authentic gender identity, is a manifestation of 
active deception. In this regard, the definition problem is brought to crisis.  
 
 In exploring the issue of sexual fraud, the remainder of this article will focus 
on the English decision of R v McNally. It will do so because, in the UK context, it is 
the only case, so far, to be considered by a superior court, and because, unlike other 
cases, it enshrines the active deception/non-disclosure distinction as the basis for es-
tablishing criminal liability. Moreover, and crucially, it seeks to explain conviction, 
explicitly, by reference to it. In this case the court held that “the sexual nature of the 
acts is, on any common sense view, different where the complainant is deliberately 
deceived by a defendant into believing that the latter is a male.”83 In other words, the 
legality of conviction is predicated on two judicial findings: (i) the defendant is fe-
male, and relatedly (ii) actively deceived the complainant into believing the contrary.  
 
 
DETERMINING GENDER  
 
On the surface of things it may seem unsurprising that McNally was found to be fe-
male. After all, McNally is a female-bodied person, with a female birth certificate. 
However, and while the Law Commission has previously recommended gender reas-
signment surgery as the tipping point where ‘apparent’ consent “should not be disre-
garded,”84 it is clear, since the Gender Recognition Act (GRA) 2004, that surgery is 
not a condition for legal recognition of gender identity in the UK.
85
 Moreover, to de-
termine gender status for the purposes of criminal prosecution by reference to legal 
gender status, would serve to make most young transgender people fair game, given 
that a condition of gender recognition is that an applicant be 18.
86
 By the same token, 
a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, a diagnosis which operates as a trigger for every-
thing that happens under the GRA,
87
 is unlikely to have been made prior to the time 
when young transgender people begin to explore their sexuality.
88
 To determine gen-
der by reference to conferral of a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC), surgical in-
tervention and/or a diagnosis of gender dysphoria is, effectively, to place transgender 
youth beyond the protection of the criminal law. Further, while such factors should 
not be viewed as determinative of gender, given their potential exclusionary effects, it 
should be noted that McNally, at least prior to prosecution, identified as male, felt 
“more comfortable” in the male gender role,89 and indicated an intention to undergo 
                                                 
83
 McNally n 2 above at [26].  
84
 Law Commission, Consent in Sex Offences. The report was annexed to Vol 2 of Setting the Bounda-
ries, n 13 above para 5.33.  
85
 GRA, s 3.  
86
 GRA, s 1.  
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88
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gender reassignment surgery.
90
 This is entirely consistent with the conclusion that 
McNally is a transgender man and inconsistent with the court’s conclusion of female 
identity.  
 
 However, the McNally case is complicated by McNally’s own contrary state-
ments on the question of gender. Thus in a witness statement, McNally stated: “I ac-
cept that [the complainant] did not consent to the sexual activity between us because 
she did not realise I was a girl and not a boy.”91 This statement is relevant to the ques-
tion of McNally’s self-understanding of gender and to the question of deception. The 
latter question, which the reader might think the statement resolves, is one that will be 
considered in the next part of this article, where a contrary view will be offered. In 
relation to gender, McNally’s apparently unambiguous statement should be treated 
with caution. In the first place, McNally speaks of gender in the past tense, never stat-
ing “I am a girl/woman,” but always “I was a girl.” This might be read as consistent 
with a particular gender journey and conceptualisation of a gendered past. Second, it 
is important to recognise that a witness statement referring to female gender identity 
is not necessarily indicative of actual or authentic gender identity.  
 
 It may be that McNally was exhausted by criminal prosecution and the media 
persecution
92
 that followed. Thus, and as noted by the Court of Appeal, McNally, in 
signing the witness statement, “just wanted it to be over.”93 In other words, we should 
not discount the possibility that such statements, as well as McNally’s guilty plea, 
point to an understandable retreat into cisnormativity, rather than indicating anything 
important about veracity or ontology. Of course, I appreciate that these observations 
about McNally’s gender identity might be viewed as speculative and I understand that 
courts have to deal with evidence as presented. Nevertheless, the idea that McNally 
might have sublimated identity and desire in the face of a legal and cultural world in 
which transgender and deception are viewed as synonymous,
94
 is one that finds sup-
port in medical evidence dealing with rates of gender persistence. Thus, while many 
young children exhibiting gender variant behaviour do not go on to identify as 
transgender as adults, those insisting on non birth-designated gender identities after 
adolescence have a very high rate of persistence into adulthood.
95
 Thus it may be that 
McNally, who after all, initially indicated a desire for gender reassignment surgery, 
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has participated in a kind of self-repudiation.
96
 This draws attention to a very real 
danger in prosecuting young transgender people on the basis of their intimate rela-
tions with others.
97
 In many respects, R v McNally can be view as a hard case produc-
ing bad law.  
 
 In this respect, we might wonder what the implications of the Court of Ap-
peal’s decision are for sexually active transgender people who offer different gender 
narratives at trial. Thus, we might ask, what would be the legal position of a 
transgender person who asserted their gender identity very clearly and consistently 
throughout the criminal justice process? Would this lead the court to take the view 
that consent is valid because of the existence of a symmetrical relationship between 
the complainant’s sexual object choice and the defendant’s gender identity, or would 
the court continue to find a disjunction, serving to vitiate consent?
98
 If so, in what cir-
cumstances would consent be found to exist? Would possession of a GRC and/or hav-
ing undertaken gender reassignment surgery resolve the gender question in a 
transgender person’s favour? The question of how gender is to be determined for the 
purposes of sexual fraud offences is obviously an important one, yet it remains un-
clear. There is an urgent need for judicial, and perhaps legislative, clarification. How-
ever, even in circumstances where a transgender person’s gender identity were to be 
acknowledged by the courts, the question of active deception would not necessarily 
disappear. While rejection of a gender identity claim (or in R v McNally, the counter-
manding of such a claim by the defendant) will bring active deception to the fore, ju-
dicial acceptance of gender identity might serve only to kick it down the road. It is to 
this question of active deception that we now turn.  
 
FINDING ACTIVE DECEPTION 
 
The court’s finding of female gender status did not seal McNally’s fate. The question 
of mens rea still had to be faced. Indeed, even resolving the question of consent under 
s. 74 of the SOA seems to have required consideration of mens rea, given that the ac-
tive deception/non-disclosure distinction appears to have injected “a certain degree of 
knowledge or intentionality” into the provision.99 In other words, and according to the 
court’s logic, even if we were to accept that McNally is female, mere non-disclosure 
of this ‘fact’ would not, of itself, lead either to vitiation of consent or to proof of mens 
rea. Accordingly, the court had to find, whether through words or deeds, active decep-
tion on the part of McNally.  
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 The Court of Appeal referred to various facts which appear, individually or 
collectively, to have been interpreted as constituting active deception. Before consid-
ering them however, it is necessary to deal with an important matter that the reader 
has perhaps anticipated. It might be thought, given the court’s conclusion that McNal-
ly is female, that active deception is abundantly evident in McNally’s male gender 
performance. The difficulty here is that although articulating a female gender identity 
at trial and subsequent appeal, McNally appears to have asserted a male gender identi-
ty prior to and at the time of the alleged offences. As discussed above, we should not 
conclude that this is disingenous simply because of subsequent retraction and/or be-
cause McNally expressed some “gender confusion.” 100  It may be that retraction 
served to conceal rather than reveal authentic gender identity in the case. At a mini-
mum, a masculine gender performance might have been consistent with McNally’s 
gender identity at the time of sexual intimacy with the complainant, and therefore at 
the moment of criminal liability.  
 
 In any event, we should not assume gender flux or playfulness to be evidence 
of deceit. There is a real danger here that cissexist understandings of gender, identity 
and authenticity will expand the net of criminalisation beyond the example of 
transgender, even on the limited question of gender identity ‘fraud.’ Thus, for exam-
ple, a woman who identifies as gender queer might perform gender in a masculine 
way. However, her performance is not deceptive. She does not act inauthentically, nor 
is she motivated by a desire to deceive. On the contrary, gender queer is precisely the 
identity position that she occupies and lives. She should not be punished because a 
sexual partner mistakenly assumes her to be male. Crucially, we should recognise the 
very real danger of coupling truth with gender performances that faithfully and con-
sistently replicate the gender binary, a binary which is, after all, more ideological than 
real.
101
   
 
 Returning to the facts of R v McNally, let us consider the question of active 
deception. It is important here to begin by recognising the degree to which we are ex-
pected to suspend our disbelief regarding the complainant’s testimony.102 The McNal-
ly case involved repeated sexual intimacies over a period of time, culminating in at 
least six occasions of oral and digital penetration of the complainant. Her claim that 
she did not know McNally was a female-bodied person seems highly implausible on 
the facts. This is especially so given that McNally was not on male hormones and so 
had not benefited from their significant masculinising effects.
103
 Moreover, McNally 
claimed that the complainant had “commented on her breasts and her high pitched 
voice.”104  Leveson LJ’s penchant for approaching the evidence in a ‘broad com-
monsense way’ seems to have deserted him in these respects. In my view, this is an 
effect of an underlying cissexist conceit that no cisgender person would knowingly 
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have sex with a transgender person. This enables fanciful claims of ignorance on the 
part of cisgender people to be entertained by the courts. It is true that McNally admit-
ted, despite an earlier contradictory statement, that the complainant was not informed 
about gender history. However, an admission of non-disclosure is an inadequate basis 
for criminal liability according to the logic of R v McNally.  
 
 In finding active deception, the court focused on several pieces of evidence. 
We have already dealt with the issue of McNally’s gender performance, which cannot 
easily be squared with deception, at least not at the time of the alleged offences. How-
ever, the court identified two statements made by McNally which relate to facts that 
might be considered material, and which might therefore be considered to constitute 
active deception.
105
 First, McNally and the complainant discussed “getting married 
and having children.”106 Yet, there is nothing necessarily deceptive about such future 
speculations. McNally would be able to marry a woman after obtaining a GRC and 
the couple would be able to have children either through adoption or in vitro fertilisa-
tion. Second, McNally apparently spoke of “‘putting it in,”’ which the complainant 
took to mean ‘his’ penis.”107 This statement, which was made during phone sex prior 
to meeting in person, was part of an exchange in which both parties spoke “about 
what they wanted to do to each other sexually.”108  A conclusion that McNally’s 
statement indicates deception fails to recognise that many transgender men consider a 
prosthetic device to be their penis.
109
 The court also attached significance to the fact 
that the complainant had purchased condoms “intending that the couple have inter-
course.”110 The inference the court drew from this fact was that McNally’s (subse-
quently retracted) claim that the complainant already knew about McNally’s gender 
identity was false.
111
 Yet, even if McNally had lied about disclosure this does not 
demonstrate active deception. More importantly, for present purposes, there is no 
necessary logical relationship between the complainant buying condoms and a belief 
that McNally had a penis. Insistence on such a relationship relies on the view that 
condoms have no use in the absence of a penis. Yet, purchase could be explained in 
terms of a concern over hygiene in the context of potential use of a prosthetic device 
that McNally did possess.
112
 Judicial treatment of these various facts reveals the ease 
with which non-disclosure of gender history can be translated into active deception. In 
this sense, R v McNally presents and should be read as a cautionary tale.  
 
 The predicament of sexually active transgender people is also evident in the 
ease with which criminal lawyers conjure up ‘problematic’ sexual scenarios. Thus 
Laird offers the example of deception in relation to chromosomes. He raises this ex-
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ample in relation to his analysis of the applicability of s. 76, rather than s. 74. He ar-
gues: “[i]f the allegation is that D presented himself as chromosomally male and C 
believes she is engaging in intercourse with someone who is chromosomally male, 
then it is not contrary to the legislative language to conceptualise this as a case involv-
ing deception as to the nature of the act.”113 Yet, this analysis raises some serious dif-
ficulties. Even if the courts were willing to process such a case through s. 76,
114
 
thereby avoiding having to wrestle with the McNally distinction, it would still be nec-
essary to prove that “the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant.”115 Yet, it 
is not clear from Laird’s example where deception would lie. It is also unclear what 
he means by: “D presented himself as a chromosomal man.” Perhaps Laird is envisag-
ing a scenario where a complainant makes an assumption about the chromosomal sta-
tus of her sexual partner. This is little different to scenarios where false assumptions 
are made about legal or genital status. Transgender men present as the men they are. 
They do not, in doing so, make any claim about their chromsosomal, legal or genital 
status. The fact that cisgender people routinely make the assumption that all men are 
cissexual (and therefore are likely to possess an XY chromosome)
116
 should not be a 
basis for finding transgender people deceptive. To find fraud in these circumstances is 
tantamount to rendering deceptive the very fact of transgender existence. We should 
also recognise that a transgender person may not be aware of the significance of the 
absence of an XY chromosome to a sexual partner.  
 
 Conversely, Laird perhaps imagines that a complainant might ask a direct 
question about chromosomal status. I think this to be rather implausible, and also like-
ly to indicate some degree of knowledge or suspicion regarding chromosomes serving 
to problematise a claim of non-consent.
117
 However, were this not the case, we ought 
to resist an argument that lying about chromosomes or, for example, some portion of 
childhood biography, constitutes intentional deception as to the ‘nature of the act,’ for 
the purposes of s. 76, or active deception regarding a material fact, for the purposes of 
s. 74. This might seem counter-intuitive to some readers. Such is the power of cissex-
ist ideology.
118
 To accept such an argument is to make chromosomes, or a linear gen-
der narrative, critical to the question of gender determination. As a matter of law, they 
are not.
119
 Nor should they be. To argue that the nature of the sexual act is different 
because of a lie of this sort, or that the lie pertains to a material fact, is to collude in 
the ontological degradation of transgender people. The question: ‘are you a chromo-
somal man’ cannot be a neutral question. It only makes sense in a world in which a 
hierarchy of men is imagined. To answer in the negative involves self-dimunition or 
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repudiation. Law ought not, through defining ‘the nature of the sexual act,’ or the ma-
teriality of facts, to privilege cisgender people in sexual relations nor confer upon 
them a right to define the bodies and authentic experiences of others. Moreover, and 
irrespective of the ethicality of lying, we should not assume its purpose is to deceive. 
This is a likely inference when the question is posed from a ciscentric perspective. 
Yet, the sorts of lies detailed here might, more realistically, be read in terms of self-
preservation.
120
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This article has considered judicial expansion of criminal liability for sexual fraud. 
This has occurred through the articulation of an active deception/non-disclosure dyad, 
whereby the former, but not the latter, has served to vitiate consent under s. 74.  It was 
argued that the distinction is wanting in two respects. First, it lacks a convincing basis 
for setting the parameters of criminal liability. Principles of liberty, causality, moral 
culpability, autonomy and harm all fail to do the necessary work. Second, it is not suf-
ficiently robust to prevent analytical collapse and therefore criminal law overreach. 
Consideration of ‘gender fraud,’ primarily through the case of McNally, served to 
dramatise this difficulty. After all, how does one stay on the right side of the law 
when, in legal and cultural terms, active deception characterises one’s ontological po-
sition? That is, how can one avoid liability, when the cultural terms through which 
one is defined are duplicity, subterfuge and dissimulation? For those who favour 
criminal prosecution irrespective of whether ‘deception’ is active or passive, my ob-
jections to using the distinction for the purposes of establishing liability for sexual 
fraud may count for little. For the judiciary, I hope they encourage caution in this ar-
ea.  
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